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Unauthorized Conduct of Government
Agents: A Restrictive Rule of Equitable
Estoppel Against the Government
The vast scope and complexity of federal regulation often
force citizens to seek advice and information from government offi-
cials. In most cases, the officials' statements prove to be correct.
Sometimes, however, the information proves to be inaccurate; in-
stead of helping the citizen to comply with federal law, the state-
ments lead the citizen into a course of noncompliance. If litigation
ensues between the government and the citizen, the crucial issue
becomes whether the government may assert a legal position con-
trary to the earlier statements made by the official. For instance, if
an official instructs a person not to file a written application for
federal benefits because the official mistakenly believes that the
person is ineligible, may the government later assert the lack of a
written application as a legal justification for denying benefits?
In analogous litigation between private parties, an individual
can seek to employ the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Estoppel
prevents a party in litigation from taking a legal position inconsist-
ent with an earlier statement or action that placed his adversary at
a disadvantage.1 More formally, an estoppel will be granted if three
conditions are satisfied: the party against whom the estoppel is
sought must have made a definite misrepresentation of fact or
law;2 the party must have had reason to believe that another would
' See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 691 (4th ed.
1971).
2 While statements of law commonly have been treated as assertions of opinion that
cannot give rise to an estoppel, see, e.g., Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312 (1893); Aunt Jemima
Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1917), that rule
has been eroded by many exceptions, see, e.g., Motherway v. Wall, 168 Mass. 333, 47 N.E.
135 (1897) (statements as to land titles); Pieh v. Flitton, 170 Minn. 29, 211 N.W. 964 (1927)
(representation that lands may be obtained by patent free from mineral reservations);
Miller v. Osterlund, 154 Minn. 495, 191 N.W. 919 (1923) (representation that a company
was qualified to do business in the state), and the more modern view is to eliminate the
distinction between statement of law and fact, see, e.g., Fainardi v. Pausata, 126 A. 865 (R.I.
1924). For a general treatment of this issue, see W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 109, at 724-25.
It should also be noted that silence in the presence of a duty to speak has been held suffi-
cient to constitute a misrepresentation. See Note, Equitable Estoppel: Does Governmental
Immunity Mean Never Having to Say You're Sorry?, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 114, 115 nn.3-5
(1981).
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rely upon the misrepresentation; and the other must have changed
his position to his prejudice in reasonable reliance upon the mis-
representation.3 In the words of Justice Cardozo, the purpose of
the doctrine of equitable estoppel is to insure that no one will be
permitted "to found any claim upon his own inequity or take ad-
vantage of his own wrong."'4
The Supreme Court, however, has never applied estoppel
against the government when unauthorized government conduct
has caused detrimental reliance by an individual. Although the
Court has not categorically stated that equitable estoppel will
never be applied against the government, it has consistently and
without exception reversed lower court decisions estopping the
government in such circumstances.5 In several recent cases, how-
ever, the Court has been careful to leave open the possibility that
the government may be estopped in appropriate cases of unautho-
rized conduct if the private litigant proves the elements of private
estoppel and demonstrates bureaucratic activity that amounts to
"affirmative misconduct."'6 Unfortunately, the Court has failed to
give content to the "affirmative misconduct" standard.
This comment examines the application of estoppel against
the government and attempts to determine when such estoppel is
appropriate. Part I surveys the Supreme Court's decisions on equi-
table estoppel against the government. Part II discusses two poli-
cies that underlie those decisions: the protection of the public fisc
and the separation of powers. Part III attempts to give meaning to
the affirmative misconduct standard by identifying a narrow sub-
class of unauthorized conduct cases in which estoppel against the
government is proper-those in which intentional misconduct or
conduct performed with reckless disregard by executive branch of-
ficials causes citizens to fail to qualify for government benefits.
I. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the authorized
acts of government agents can support an estoppel against the
government,7 but that the unauthorized acts of those agents
" See W. PRoSSER, supra note 1, § 105, at 691. For reliance to be reasonable, the party
must be unaware of the true fact and must be justified in being unaware. See Heckler v.
Community Health Servs., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984).
Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1934).
' See, e.g., Heckler v. Community Health Servs., Inc., 467 U.S. 51 (1984); Miranda v.
INS, 459 U.S. 14 (1982) (per curiam).
See, e.g., INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (per curiam).
See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). In Santobello, the Supreme
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cannot.8 While distinguished commentators have argued that the
concept of "authority" should be interpreted broadly so as to
widen the applicability of estoppel against the government,' the
"authority" line itself has appeared impregnable. More recent Su-
preme Court decisions, however, have suggested that unauthorized
official conduct may give rise to an estoppel against the govern-
ment where the litigant makes out the requisites of private estop-
pel and shows the existence of "affirmative misconduct." To shed
more light on the "affirmative misconduct" standard, this section
sets forth those decisions.
In Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill,10 two farmers had
relied on a government agent's promise that their entire wheat
crop would be federally insured. Unbeknownst to the farmers and
the agent, regulations recently promulgated by the FCIC had pro-
hibited insurance for a portion of the crop. When a drought de-
stroyed the wheat, the Merrills sought to recover on their policy,
but the FCIC cited its regulations and refused to pay. In later liti-
gation, the Merrills argued that the government should be es-
topped from asserting the concededly valid regulations as a de-
fense. The Court assumed that the requirements for private
estoppel had been satisfied, but held that estoppel was unwar-
ranted in this case.1" According to the Court, respondents are pre-
sumed to know the content of FCIC regulations regardless of the
"hardship resulting from innocent ignorance. 1 12 In addition, estop-
Court considered the validity of a revocation of a plea bargaining arrangement. A prosecutor
had promised not to recommend a sentence in return for the defendant's plea of guilty to a
lesser charge. Later, a new prosecutor recommended a sentence for the original charge. The
action was inadvertent and not malicious, as the second prosecutor was unaware of the ini-
tial promises. Nevertheless, the Court relied on considerations of equitable estoppel in re-
fusing to permit the second prosecutor to assume a legal position contrary to the plea bar-
gain negotiated by the original prosecutor. Id. at 262.
Other examples of federal court estoppel of the government in authorized conduct cases
include Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U.S. 165, 172 (1914) (government cannot assert
legal position contrary to representations in lawful contract), Dayton Airplane Co. v. United
States, 21 F.2d 673, 674 (6th Cir. 1927) (same), and Vestal v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 132
(D.C. Cir. 1945) (after taxing group as a partnership, tax commissioner cannot later assert
that the group should be treated as a corporation).
8 See, for example, the cases discussed infra notes 10-34 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. CH. L. Rav. 680 (1954).
20 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
Id. at 383-84.
" Id. at 385. In contrast, Justice Jackson noted: "If he were to peruse this voluminous
and dull publication as it is issued from time to time in order to make sure whether any-
thing has been promulgated that affects his rights, he would never need crop insurance, for
he would never get time to plant any crops. Nor am I convinced that a reading of techni-
cally-worded regulations would enlighten him much in any event." 332 U.S. at 387 (Jackson,
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pel against the government would violate "the duty of all courts to
observe the conditions defined by Congress for charging the public
treasury."' 3 Considered in light of the broad rationales offered by
the Court, Merrill appeared to announce a per se rule against es-
toppel in cases of unauthorized conduct.
Montana v. Kennedy 4 departed from the strict approach
taken in Merrill and was the first case to suggest that estoppel
might apply against the government."' An alien sought to estop the
government from asserting his lack of citizenship as a grounds for
deportation. The alien argued that he would have been born in
America had his mother, an American citizen, not been denied a
passport to return to the United States by an American immigra-
tion official who mistakenly interpreted a federal statute as prohib-
iting her from entering the United States without a passport. The
Court refused to estop the government since the official's "well-
meant advice" fell "far short of misconduct such as might prevent
the United States from relying on petitioner's foreign birth."1 " Al-
though the Court did not decide if the government could ever be
estopped, some lower courts interpreted this permissive dicta to
mean that estoppel against the government might be appropriate
in other unauthorized-conduct cases.1 7
The Court's next major estoppel decision, INS v. Hibi,15 con-
firmed the Court's desire to maintain flexibility despite Merrill's
J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 385.
14 366 U.S. 308 (1961).
Is Some commentators view Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951), as a radical
departure from Merrill. See, e.g., Recent Developments: Back to Square One: Estoppel
Against the Government after Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Miranda, 16
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1053, 1063 (1983). In that case, appellant sought to estop enforce-
ment of an American statutory rule that foreign citizens who chose not to serve in the mili-
tary could not apply for American citizenship. Moser believed that the statute interfered
with a treaty with Switzerland, his native country. He based his claim on the State Depart-
ment's advice to the Swiss Legation after the latter assured him that signing a form to avoid
military service, which contained the waiver of citizenship in a footnote, would not jeopard-
ize his ability to obtain citizenship. The Court held that Moser had signed the form without
intending to waive citizenship after seeking guidance from the highest authority that he
could, and so properly believed he would not lose his rights to seek citizenship. 341 U.S. at
45-47.
Since the decision was expressly based on lack of intelligent waiver of rights, not on
estoppel, many scholars reject the view that Moser represented a departure from Merrill.
See, e.g., Gordon, Finality of Immigration and Nationality Determinations-Can the Gov-
ernment Be Estopped?, 31 U. CHL L. REv. 433, 455 (1964).
16 366 U.S. at 314-15.
17 See, e.g., Tejeda v. INS, 346 F.2d 389, 393 (9th Cir. 1965).
18 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (per curiam).
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per se approach. In Hibi, a foreign national sought to estop the
government from asserting a statutory deadline for applying for
citizenship against him, arguing that the government neither in-
formed him of his right to apply nor stationed nationalization offi-
cials in his country during the applicable statutory period. 9 In lan-
guage that echoed Montana, the Court held that the government
could not be estopped because failure to publicize rights or station
officials in a foreign country did not amount to "affirmative mis-
conduct. '20 The Court seemed to suggest that if the government
could be estopped at all, a plaintiff would have to make at least
this much of a showing in order to prevail on such a claim.
Against a backdrop of several lower court decisions over the
next eight years that found "affirmative misconduct" and estopped
the government,2 the Supreme Court addressed the issue again in
Schweiker v. Hansen.22 In Hansen, the plaintiff tried to estop the
government from enforcing a regulation that required potential
beneficiaries under the Social Security Act to file written applica-
tions in order to qualify for certain insurance benefits. Although
she would have been eligible to obtain these benefits had she filed
the required application, the plaintiff failed to qualify because a
government field agent, who mistakenly believed that the plaintiff
was ineligible, instructed her not to apply. Despite sympathy for
plaintiff's predicament, the Court declined the invitation to estop
the government, holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish
the requisite "affirmative misconduct. '23
In reaching this decision, the Court refused to adopt the lower
court's analysis, which had suggested that it was more appropriate
to estop the government when a procedural requirement had been
asserted than when a substantive requirement was involved. 4 The
Court reinforced its favorable treatment of the government in es-
toppel cases by resurrecting the concerns expressed in Merrill
about congressional limitations on public expenditures.2 5 Finally,
" Id. at 6-8.
20 Id. at 8-9.
21 See Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1361 (9th Cir. 1980) (four-year delay in consider-
ing occupational preference classification is affirmative misconduct); Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534
F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976) (one-year delay in labor certification is affirmative misconduct);
Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976) (failure to warn unmarried alien that
she could be deported if she married before entering the country was affirmative
misconduct).
-- 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (per curiam).
22 Id. at 788-90.
Id. at 790.
Id. at 788 n.4.
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the Court provided some insight into how the elements of private
estoppel might apply against the government by suggesting in
dicta that reliance upon oral representations of government offi-
cials might be per se unreasonable."
The Supreme Court soon elaborated and expanded upon Han-
sen in Miranda v. INS.27 Miranda presented an attempt to estop
the government based on its long delay in processing a permanent
residency petition. The Ninth Circuit construed Hansen narrowly
to apply only in cases involving the expenditure of public funds,
and held that estoppel was appropriate s.2 The Supreme Court re-
versed, expressly rejecting this narrow reading of Hansen. Instead,
the Court held that mere delay was not affirmative misconduct and
that public funds were not the only area "of broad public con-
cern"2 that prevented estoppel of the government.
The Court's most recent consideration of this issue came in
Heckler v. Community Health Services, Inc.30 A company called
Community Health Services (CHS) participated in the Medicare
and CETA programs. CHS was reimbursed for the costs of services
provided to Medicare recipients, but was doubly reimbursed for
some specific operating expenses because of overlap between the
two programs. Government regulations prevented this double re-
covery unless the CETA funds were used as "seed money" for new
health care agencies or for expanded services at existing agencies.
CHS's fiscal intermediary, a private party acting on behalf of the
government, orally informed CHS that these particular CETA
funds fell within the seed money exception. CHS relied on this ad-
vice to expand its services and requested reimbursements from the
government while continuing to receive CETA grants. When the
Health and Human Services Department later ruled that the
CETA grants were not seed money, CHS sought to block recovery
of the funds by estopping the government from asserting its con-
26 Id. The decision in Hansen has been described as "quite a significant setback in the
gradual development by the lower courts of law that the government may be estopped." 4
KENNETH DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20:5 (2d ed. 1983). By concentrating on
conduct that could justify estoppel, others argue the Court implied that the government
could be estopped. Recent Developments, supra note 15, at 1072; 4 K DAviS, supra, § 20:5.
The result is that no one knows for sure whether the lower court decisions estopping the
government remain valid. See New Jersey v. HHS, 670 F.2d 1284, 1296 n.17 (3d Cir.) (where
lower court decisions diverge from traditional rule against equitable estoppel of the govern-
ment, many may be irreconcilable with Hansen), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982).
27 459 U.S. 14 (1982) (per curiam).
2- 673 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 459 U.S. 14 (1982).
2 459 U.S. at 19.
20 467 U.S. 51 (1984).
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cededly correct interpretation of the regulations in an action
against CHS.
Although the Third Circuit accepted this argument and es-
topped the government, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed.3 1
The Court rested its decision on the ground that CHS failed to
establish the requisite elements of private estoppel.3 2 The decision
also echoed Merrill's insistence that citizens are presumed to know
the law and that they may not rely on agents' erroneous state-
ments of it; the Court simply concluded that the government can-
not be expected to guarantee that every piece of informal advice
will be accurate.3 Once again, however, the Court refused to hold
that the government could never be estopped, stating that there
could be some cases in which "the public interest" would require
it. 3 4
Heckler's recent statement of the law still leaves this issue
very confused. Although the Supreme Court has consistently re-
versed lower court decisions granting estoppel, it has continued to
leave open the possibility that equitable estoppel might apply
against the government in some cases. While the series of reversals
demonstrates that the Supreme Court takes an inhospitable view
of this possibility, the boundaries of its analysis are not clear. This
lack of clarity shows up in the variety of positions and analyses
that the lower courts have employed in such cases.3 5 Until the Su-
31 The Third Circuit acknowledged that the government could not be estopped as read-
ily as a private party, but it still granted the estoppel. Community Health Servs., Inc. v.
Califano, 698 F.2d 615, 620-21 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 51 (1984). It found detrimental
reliance by considering the effect of withdrawing the funds on indigent county residents
because of the error of the only government agent CHS could consult. Id. at 625-26. Affirm-
ative misconduct was found in the intermediary's violation of an HHS regulation requiring
it to confirm its advice with HHS. Id. at 623-24.
31 467 U.S. at 60-61.. The Court held that surrendering funds a citizen had used but
was not entitled to did not constitute detriment, as the expansion occurred through the
unlawful use of those funds. Id. at 62-63. CHS lost no legal right and was not harmed by
any change of position. Id.
33 Id. at 63 & n.17.
34 Id. at 60.
31 At least six different standards have been applied in the lower federal courts: (1)
courts have relied upon general notions of fairness, see, e.g., Community Health Servs., Inc.
v. Califano, 698 F.2d 615, 627 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 51 (1984); United States v. Lazy
FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1973); (2) courts have employed an "affirmative mis-
conduct" standard, though with varying results, compare Leimbach v. Califano, 596 F.2d
300, 304 (8th Cir. 1979) (misinformation does not estop), with United States v. Ruby Co.,
588 F.2d 697, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1978) (affirmative misconduct is "affirmative misrepresenta-
tion or affirmative concealment of a material fact by the government"), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 917 (1979), and with Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1976)
(affirmative misconduct only if government agent violates affirmative procedure required by
regulations); (3) courts have adopted a balancing test that compares the interests of the
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preme Court sets forth the policies that underlie its decisions in
more detail, this confusion is likely to continue.
II. THE POLICIES IMPLICATED BY ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT
The doctrine of estoppel has been justified as an equitable
doctrine that prevents parties from taking advantage of their own
wrongs s.3  The Supreme Court's decisions about the application of
estoppel to unauthorized official conduct raise the difficult ques-
tion of why the government deserves special treatment under the
doctrine. Why should the government be permitted to take advan-
tage of the wrongs of its agents when private litigants who are sim-
ilarly situated would be estopped? Although the cases fail to spell
out any compelling rationale, two interests peculiar to the govern-
ment may offset the benefits that normally are taken to justify the
imposition of an estoppel: protection of the public fisc and preser-
vation of the separation of powers. The following subsections ex-
amine how these policies bear on estoppel against the government.
A. Protection of the Public Fisc
The most common justification for special treatment of the
government in estoppel decisions is to protect the public fisc. In-
deed, the Court explicitly endorsed that rationale in Merrill5 7 and
Hansen.ss Although the Court never explained how a refusal to es-
top the government would protect the public fisc, many explana-
tions are apparent. First, a rule of no estoppel in cases against the
government and the interests of the individual, see, e.g., United States v. Georgia-Pacific
Co., 421 F.2d 92, 100 (9th Cir. 1970); (4) still others differentiate between sovereign and
proprietary functions, allowing estoppel of the government in the latter cases where the
requisites of private estoppel are established, see, e.g., George v. Railroad Retirement Bd.,
738 F.2d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 1984); FDIC v. Harrison, 735 F.2d 408, 411 (11th Cir. 1984);
Hicks v. Harris, 606 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1979), though the validity of that approach is
doubtful in light of Merrill, which found no estoppel where the Court assumed that the
requisites of private estoppel were established and that the government was acting in a
capacity analogous to a private insurer; (5) others simply hold that the federal government
is not liable for the unauthorized acts of its agents, see, e.g., Werner v. Department of Inte-
rior, Fish & Wildlife Serv., 581 F.2d 168, 172 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ulvedal, 372
F.2d 31, 35 (8th Cir. 1967); and (6) some courts have held that the government may be
estopped from asserting a mere procedural, as opposed to a substantive, statutory or regula-
tory requirement, see Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 450 U.S.
785 (1981) (per curiam). The Supreme Court cast doubt on this approach, however, by its
discussion in reversing Hansen.
3' See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
37 332 U.S. at 385.
450 U.S. at 788 n.4.
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government reduces the risk that misrepresentations and omissions
by the government's agents will cause it to suffer financial losses.
Second, such a rule ensures that Congress's constitutional power to
spend and allocate resources is not interfered with by judicial en-
forcement of unauthorized expenditures. Third, the rule prevents
the diversion of resources away from other government programs
to pay for the damage caused by estoppel. Fourth, a no estoppel
rule discourages individuals who feel aggrieved by onerous statutes
and regulations from resorting to collusion with government offi-
cials, perhaps through bribery, in order to secure favorable official
misrepresentations that would bind the government in future
litigation.
The capacity of an estoppel rule to affect the public fisc
should not be underestimated. A Seventh Circuit decision,
Portmann v. United States,9 provides an excellent illustration of
the potential impact of an estoppel upon the public treasury. A
citizen who wished to mail valuable photographs paid to insure
them after a Postal Service employee assured her that the fee
would provide insurance of up to $50,000. After the packages were
lost, the Postal Service stated that it could pay only $500 because
the applicable regulations classified the photographs as "merchan-
dise" rather than as "negotiable documents." Distinguishing the
Supreme Court's decision in Merrill, the Seventh Circuit estopped
the Postal Service from asserting the regulation as a defense in the
citizen's action. Although the court professed concern for the pub-
lic fisc, arguing rather abstractly that a failure to estop the govern-
ment from asserting the regulation would lower consumer confi-
dence and hence reduce revenues,40 the court's decision to estop
the government actually cost the public treasury several thousand
dollars.
Nonetheless, there are several reasons to doubt whether the
public fisc rationale can explain the Court's estoppel decisions. To
begin with, in many cases the plaintiff seeking estoppel would be
statutorily entitled to the benefit but for the misconduct by a gov-
ernment official. This was the case in Schweiker v. Hansen, for ex-
ample, where the plaintiff would have been entitled to Social Se-
curity but for the official's negligence. In these cases, because the
payment to the beneficiary has been statutorily authorized, there is
no danger of depleting the public fisc, upsetting the budget, or di-
verting funds from other sources. In fact, prohibiting estoppel in
39 674 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1982).
40 Id. at 1168-69.
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these cases only saves the government money that it would be ex-
pected to have spent.
The public fisc rationale is particularly weak in light of the
vast resources that the government possesses today: estoppel
presents little danger of bankrupting the public treasury. This ra-
tionale is further eroded by the fact that the Congress has author-
ized payment of large and unpredictable amounts in tort claims
against the government.41 And if the primary concern is instead to
protect the public fisc by deterring collusion between private par-
ties and government agents, a rule of no estoppel is a curiously
circuitous measure that hardly provides much additional deter-
rence beyond the vigorous enforcement of criminal sanctions
against those who commit fraud. 2
The public fisc rationale is also far too narrow to support a
universal rule against estoppel.45 While it is not difficult to extend
the public fisc analysis to public land cases,4 4 it is difficult if not
impossible to extend that analysis to cover immigration decisions
like INS v. Hibi,45 where the only effect of an estoppel would be to
grant citizenship to the applicant.
Finally, insofar as the no estoppel rule protects the public fisc
by reducing the risk that the government will suffer financial losses
4 See The Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982). This point is a
limited response to the vague and general fears that are occasionally expressed about the
possible effects of estoppel on the public treasury. One can strongly argue, of course, that
the Act explicitly refuses to waive sovereign immunity and permit estoppel to serve as an
independent cause of action against the government. Yet this does not preclude the use of
estoppel as a procedural bar. For discussion of these issues, see infra notes 60-75 and accom-
panying text.
42 See Berger, supra note 9, at 684 ("To the extent that a deterrent against public
fraud is required, it is supplied by the severe criminal sanctions imposed for defrauding the
government.").
42 In Miranda v. INS, 459 U.S. 14 (1982) (per curiam), the Supreme Court realized that
an exclusive focus on estoppel's effect on the public fisc could result in thwarting important
nonmonetary policies mandated by Congress. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to
estop the government in immigration cases. The Supreme Court also has refused to estop
the government in cases involving public lands. See Lee v. Monroe & Thornton, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 366, 369 (1813).
Lower federal courts also have applied the no estoppel rule in cases where estoppel
would have little or no effect upon the public fisc. Jackson v. United States, 573 F.2d 1189
(Ct. Cl. 1978), provides a good example. The plaintiff, a member of the army reserve, sought
to estop the government based upon an army recruiter's representation that the plaintiff
would not have to participate in certain combat maneuvers if he enlisted. The Court of
Claims refused to grant the estoppel. But see Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.
1982).
44 See, e.g., Lee v. Monroe & Thornton, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366 (1813).
41 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (per curiam), discussed supra at notes 18-20 and accompanying
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from the misrepresentations of its agents, it does so at a high
cost-innocent litigants are forced to bear that risk. In most areas
of the law, courts strike this balance differently, binding the princi-
pal to the acts of his agent as long as the agent acts within the
scope of his apparent authority. 6
B. Separation of Powers
Because the public fisc rationale has limited explanatory
power, commentators have tried to develop a more powerful justifi-
cation for the no estoppel rule. What has emerged is a separate but
related rationale based on the doctrine of separation of powers.4
This argument begins by noting that the federal judiciary is
responsible for maintaining the separation of powers among the
three branches of government.48 Since the Constitution itself man-
dates the separation of powers, the Supreme Court's prohibition
against a branch's extension of its authority is necessary if the
Court is to fulfill its responsibility as the ultimate constitutional
interpreter.4 9 But the Court has not preserved the separation of
powers for constitutional reasons alone. It has also stressed the
doctrine's vital importance to the operation of a limited govern-
ment. To the framers, "the doctrine of separation of powers was
not mere theory; it was a felt necessity," 50 designed to prevent ar-
bitrary power 51 and check tyranny.52 Consequently, the Court's ac-
tive role in preserving the separation of powers can be justified by
the framers' recognition that "a mere demarcation on parchment
46 Cases demonstrating this principle are numerous in the corporate law context. See,
e.g., Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. Dean, 58 F.2d 737 (6th Cir.) (execution of time limitations
waiver is within agent's apparent authority and binds corporation), cert. denied, 287 U.S.
623 (1932); In re Mulco Prods., Inc., 50 Del. 28, 123 A.2d 95 (Super. Ct.) (borrowing money
and executing a corporate note are within agent's apparent authority and binds corpora-
tion), aff'd sub nom. Mulco Prods., Inc. v. Black, 50 Del. 246, 127 A.2d 851 (1956); Fair
Mercantile Co. v. Union-May-Stern Co., 359 Mo. 385, 221 S.W.2d 751 (1949) (compromising
corporate note is within agent's apparent authority and binds corporation).
47 For the leading discussion of estoppel in cases against the government and the sepa-
ration of powers, see Berger, supra note 9; see also Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Govern-
ment, 79 COLUm. L. REv. 551 (1979).
46 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
4' See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
50 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see also Buckley v. Vaieo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) (per curiam).
61 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 240, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
52 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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of the constitutional limits of the several departments is not a suf-
ficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyranni-
cal concentration of all the powers of government in the same
hands."5 3
The application of the doctrine of separation of powers to es-
toppel against the government is straightforward. If the govern-
ment is estopped as a result of unauthorized government action,
congressional power to legislate under article I is undermined: in
effect, courts would be refusing to apply the law as enacted by
Congress because an executive branch official has misrepresented
the content of the law to the citizen. Estoppel would endorse the
decisions of executive agents that are contrary to congressional
commands and directives. The executive branch would be refash-
ioning the law through its errors in individual cases, thus contra-
vening the separation of powers.
By contrast, a rule of no estoppel in unauthorized conduct
cases protects legislative power from executive branch encroach-
ment. It recognizes that executive branch officials may not exercise
powers beyond those delegated by Congress. 4 Congress has not
delegated the power to alter statutory requirements to such offi-
cials, and a citizen's reliance, even if sufficient to support estoppel
in an action against another private party, cannot confer such
power upon the executive.
Separation of powers concerns weigh just as heavily against a
litigant who seeks to estop enforcement of an administrative regu-
lation as they do against a litigant who seeks to estop enforcement
of a statute. This proposition is supported by the Supreme Court's
decisions in Merrill, Hansen, and Heckler, where the Court treated
administrative action as a manifestation of congressional power
rather than as executive power. 5 Thus, estoppel involving an ad-
ministrative regulation adopted within the terms of a governing
statute raises separation of powers concerns similar to estoppel in-
volving the statute itself.56
1' THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 52, at 313 (J. Madison).
54 See Berger, supra note 9, at 686; Housing Auth. v. Bergland, 749 F.2d 1184, 1190
(6th Cir. 1984); Recent Development, Schweiker v. Hansen: Equitable Estoppel Against the
Government, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 609, 614-15 (1982).
" Heckler, 467 U.S. at 63; Hansen, 450 U.S. at 788; Merrill, 332 U.S. at 385.
' Even if the Court characterized administrative action as an exercise of executive
power, as it typically does in the context of the nondelegation doctrine, see, e.g., INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983), the conclusion that separation of powers concerns are
absent when the courts estop the government from enforcing federal regulations does not
follow. Since regulations adopted by agencies are not subject to the requirements of bicam-
eralism and presentment to the President, they take on the force of law in a manner that is
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Separation of powers analysis also makes clear that estoppel
should be allowed where the official has acted in a capacity author-
ized by statute. An action that is properly authorized by the legis-
lature cannot be seen as an encroachment by the executive branch
upon the legislative branch. Thus, the separation of powers doc-
trine offers no obstacle to estopping the government in cases of
authorized conduct.
The case law generally reflects this same dichotomy." For ex-
ample, in Vestal v. Commissioner,58 the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit held that the IRS, having collected taxes from a group of peo-
ple by treating them as a partnership, should be estopped from
collecting taxes again by treating the same entity as a corpora-
tion. A separation of powers analysis justifies this result. When
the Commissioner initially treated the taxpayer as a partnership,
he did so with clear congressional authorization: he acted in a man-
ner consistent with the Internal Revenue Code. Nothing in the
statute, however, authorized the Commission to tax the group
again as a corporation. Because estoppel in this case would not
frustrate congressional intent, it would not contravene separation
of powers principles.
III. THE APPROPRIATE CASE FOR ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT
The previous section demonstrated that the Supreme Court's
reluctance to apply estoppel against the government derives from
two basic concerns: the weaker concern about impairing the public
fisc and the stronger concern about violating the separation of
powers. These same concerns underlie the doctrine of sovereignimmunity, which prohibits suits against the government without
its consent. In identifying the appropriate case for estoppel against
consistent with the separation of powers only if the agency acts within the scope of its au-
thority. Thus, in adopting regulations, agencies must adhere to the standards stated in their
organic legislation and must follow the procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure
Act. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982).
To ensure compliance with their organic statutes and the Administrative Procedure
Act, agency regulations are subject to judicial review. See id. §§ 701-706. Were courts to
estop the enforcement of regulations based on officials' unauthorized statements, they would
in effect be granting the force of law to agency action that failed to comply with the APA
and was not subject to judicial review, a result that is also inconsistent with the separation
of powers. Consequently, similar separation of powers concerns should guide the use of es-
toppel in both the statutory and regulatory contexts.
5 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
's 152 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
Id. at 136-37.
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the government, two very different kinds of cases must be distin-
guished: those in which estoppel is sought merely as a procedural
device to bar a defense and those in which estoppel is used to as-
sert an independent cause of action for misrepresentation. This
section argues that the use of estoppel to assert an independent
cause of action is inappropriate because the consent of the sover-
eign is necessary to bring such cases. Accordingly, estoppel of the
government is only appropriate in cases where it is used as a proce-
dural device to bar a defense. But, as this section will argue, even
in these cases estoppel should be allowed only when intentional or
reckless government conduct has caused a plaintiff to fail to qual-
ify for statutory benefits.
A. Estoppel Versus Misrepresentation
Because estoppel involves the forfeiture of government claims
and defenses without the consent of the sovereign, it can be viewed
as a violation of sovereign immunity. Oddly, this argument has
rarely appeared either in judicial opinions or in scholarly work. 0
This may reflect dissatisfaction with the sovereign immmunity
doctrine, which has been much-cri'ticized. 1e It may also be attribu-
table to the popular characterization of estoppel as a purely proce-
dural device. Estoppel against the government developed as part of
the administrative law powers of the federal courts, which were
largely based on common law before the enactment of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.6 2 Thus, estoppel has usually been treated
as a procedural mechanism that merely precludes a party from as-
serting a defense, and has not been seen as an independent cause
of action that would require the blessing of Congress.
Nonetheless, several of the cases in which estoppel has been
sought against the government can be viewed as attempts to assert
an independent cause of action against the government based on
the misrepresentations of its agents.6 3 These cases can be con-
60 One of the few estoppel cases mentioning sovereign immunity is United States v.
Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 98-99 (9th Cir. 1970). See also Berger, supra note 9, at 683.
41 See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d at 99 & nn.13-14; Note, supra note 47, at 554.
" See, e.g., 1 K. DAvis, supra note 26, §§ 1:5-:8 (1978).
43 Tort claims against the government based solely on misrepresentation are barred by
the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982). This exception has been ap-
plied to cases in which plaintiffs have relied on statements by the government to their finan-
cial detriment. In Neustadt v. United States, 366 U.S. 696 (1961), for example, the Supreme
Court barred the plaintiff's claim alleging that he had purchased his home for more than it
was worth in reliance upon an appraisal by a Federal Housing Administration official. Neu-
stadt was somewhat limited, however, by Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. 289 (1983), where it was
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trasted with those in which statements by government agents
cause an individual to fail to qualify for benefits to which he would
otherwise have been entitled.
A good example of an estoppel case that resembles an action
for misrepresentation is Merrille4 where two farmers relied to their
detriment on a government agent's advice that their entire wheat
crop would be insured. This representation did not cause the
plaintiffs to fail to qualify for a statutory benefit; thus, the plain-
tiffs were actually asserting estoppel as an independent cause of
action for misrepresentation rather than as a procedural bar.
Hecklere5 is another such case, for CHS relied on the government's
advice that government funds could be used to pay for a certain
type of expenditure that was in fact barred by regulations. The
group then sought to block the government from recovering the
funds by estopping it from asserting the existence of the regula-
tion.66 Once again, estoppel in this case would have allowed the
plaintiff to claim a government benefit for which it could not have
qualified in the absence of any misrepresentation.
Along the same lines as Merrill and Heckler is the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Portmann,17 where the postal employee told a
citizen that her package would be insured for $50,000 although the
applicable regulations limited insurance benefits to $500. Under
these facts, the citizen did not purchase $50,000 of insurance from
the post office and could not have done so even if the postal em-
ployee had correctly represented the law. The postal employee's
misrepresentation did cause the citizen to forgo an opportunity to
mail her package by private delivery service, where greater insur-
ance benefits were available, but did not cause her to fail to take
appropriate actions to qualify for government benefits.
Because the government conduct in this class of cases does not
cause individuals to fail to qualify for government benefits to
which they would otherwise be entitled, the application of estoppel
would violate sovereign immunity. Estoppel is not being used
held that the misrepresentation exception did not apply where a government official affirma-
tively undertook to supervise construction of the plaintiff's house. This undertaking was
held "distinct from any duty to use care in communicating information to respondent." Id.
at 297.
332 U.S. 380 (1947), discussed supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
e' 467 U.S. 51 (1984), discussed supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
For another estoppel case that is similar to a cause of action for misrepresentation,
see United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973), where the effect of estop-
ping the government was to allow a partnership to receive payments it would not have been
entitled to but for the misrepresentation.
67 674 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1982), discussed supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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merely as a procedural device to bar the government from assert-
ing a defense, but is being offered as the basis for an independent
cause of action. This use of estoppel also endangers the public fisc
since it compels government expenditures that were never author-
ized by Congress. In addition, separation of powers principles may
well be violated, since estoppel in effect would allow executive
usurpation of Congress's power to legislate and allocate govern-
ment resources.
Moreover, cases like these-having no basis in any statututory
entitlement-differ greatly from cases where the plaintiff would
have qualified for a statutory benefit had the government agent
acted properly. In the latter class of cases, the plaintiff asserts es-
toppel against the government to gain access to government bene-
fits for which he is not statutorily entitled in fact but for which he
could have satisfied the statutory requirements had the govern-
ment official rendered the correct advice. The Supreme Court's de-
cision in Hansen" is the paradigm for this kind of claim. Hansen
failed to qualify for social security benefits after a government offi-
cial instructed her not to file a written application, incorrectly be-
lieving that the citizen failed to satisfy statutory requirements.
Under these circumstances, it can be said that the field agent's
misrepresentation actually caused the citizen to fail to qualify for
the benefits.
Similarly, in the Hibi case"9 the INS did not properly imple-
ment an immigration program that was intended to aid foreign na-
tionals who had served in the United States Armed Forces during
World War II. Under the program, the INS was supposed to sta-
tion immigration officials in foreign countries so that qualified vet-
erans could apply for United States citizenship. The INS failed,
however, to station officials in the Philippines before the statutory
period for applications expired. Disgruntled veterans brought suit
seeking American citizenship, arguing that the INS should be es-
topped from asserting as a defense the plaintiff's failure to comply
with the statutory deadline for applications. The veterans argued
with considerable force that but for the government's misconduct
they would have qualified for citizenship."'
450 U.S. 785 (1981), discussed supra at notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
, 414 U.S. 5 (1973).
70 There is, of course, always a question whether the causal relationship between the
government's misconduct and the plaintiff's harm is close enough to support an estoppel.
This problem also arose in Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961), where an alien sought
to estop the government from asserting his lack of citizenship on the ground that he would
have been born here but for an American immigration official's erroneous advice that his
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This second class of cases presents a much stronger basis for
estopping the government. Sovereign immunity concerns are much
weaker because the plaintiffs are using estoppel not to assert an
independent cause of action but rather to claim a government ben-
efit to which they would be entitled but for the government's mis-
conduct. The estoppel is no more than a procedural device that
prevents the government from asserting a defense against a plain-
tiff's statutorily based claim; thus, there is no need for sovereign
authorization. Moreover, the plaintiff is claiming a benefit for
which Congress already has allocated resources.7 1 Because the
plaintiff would have been entitled to those resources in the absence
of any misconduct, allowing the estoppel does not threaten the
public fisc.
In addition, general fairness concerns weigh in favor of estop-
pel when the government's misrepresentations cause an individual
not to qualify for a statutory benefit. The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that in today's welfare state, where many people rely on a
large array of government benefits, statutory entitlements are tan-
tamount to property and thus are protected by the due process
clause.7 2 The government need not provide the benefits in the first
place, but once it does so it must also afford procedural protections
for those who are entitled to receive them.7 3 Along the same lines,
there is a strong argument that when government misconduct de-
prives beneficiaries of statutory entitlements, due process princi-
mother could not return to the United States.
Other cases in which misinformation by government officials caused plaintiffs not to
qualify for statutory benefits include Cheers v. Secretary of HEW, 610 F.2d 463 (7th Cir.
1979) (plaintiff failed'to file a written application for social security benefits after being
erroneously told he was ineligible); Leimbach v. Califano, 596 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1979) (so-
cial security administration erroneously told plaintiff his children were not eligible for survi-
vors' benefits); United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975) (plaintiffs failed to
perfect homesteading claims as a result of- government misinformation); Miller v. United
States, 500 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1974) (taxpayer's refund suit was filed late as a result of
government misinformation); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1970) (government
failure to notify plaintiffs of an appeal requirement caused them to fail to qualify for an oil
and gas lease); United States v. Fox Lake State Bank, 366 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1966) (govern-
ment misonduct would have caused bank to forfeit insurance claims on loans).
71 See, e.g., Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 962 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concur-
ring) (court's decision estopping the government from asserting the plaintiff's lack of a writ-
ten social security application "does not drain the public fisc of one dollar that is being
spent either in excess of anticipated benefit levels or contrary to a substantive policy deci-
sion of the Congress."), rev'd sub nom. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (per
curiam).
7' See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see also Reich, The New Property,
73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
73 See, e.g., Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261-63.
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ples of fairness are implicated.
As with the first class of estoppel cases, however, this second
class of cases raises separation of powers concerns. Estopping the
government leaves a litigant in possession of government benefits
even though he concededly failed to satisfy statutory or regulatory
requirements. Congress is normally presumed to intend compliance
with all of the requirements it imposes; hence, an estoppel that
circumvents such procedural requirements as deadlines and filing
details, on the basis that the estoppel will further the substantive
purposes of the statute, does indeed frustrate congressional intent
to some extent.74 Requirements as they were erroneously stated by
an unelected official are substituted for requirements as they were
actually set forth by Congress or the appropriate regulatory
agency.
Nonetheless, a countervailing separation of powers concern is
present in the second class of cases that is absent in the first; in
order to vindicate the more fundamental purposes of a statute, it
may be necessary for the judiciary to permit a lesser breach of con-
gressional will. In cases like Hansen the detriment suffered by citi-
zens is the failure to qualify for government benefits. Yet Congress
intended these litigants to receive the benefits if they were willing
to undertake the effort of applying for them. Only through the gov-
ernment's misrepresentations did the citizens not undertake that
effort and receive the benefits Congress had determined they
should have. In such cases, not permitting the litigants to estop the
government effectively frustrates the congressional judgment to
award the benefits. In effect, a no estoppel rule permits the execu-
tive branch to undermine legislative programs-and thus the sepa-
ration of powers-simply by intentionally or unintentionally mis-
informing the public. Thus, the application of estoppel in this
second class of cases can be understood as preserving the separa-
tion of powers by ensuring that executive officials cannot block
benefits from going to those whom Congress intended to have
them.
This same argument cannot be made in the first class of cases,
where the misrepresentations do not cause citizens to fail to qual-
ify for government benefits they would have been authorized to re-
71 As Judge Friendly noted in his dissent from the lower court's decision in Hansen:
"Congress did not wish all those eligible for divorced mother's security benefits to receive
them as from the date of their eligibility. It wished such benefits to flow only to those apply-
ing for them as prescribed by HEW." Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 957 (2d Cir. 1980)
(Friendly, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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ceive. In these cases, Congress did not intend the litigants to re-
ceive the benefits they seek. The Portmann case75 is an example.
There the statute limited insurance benefits to $500, and Congress
clearly intended that no citizen would receive any larger amount.
In this context, a no estoppel rule maintains the separation of pow-
ers by preventing the executive from disrupting legislative
programs.
B. Affirmative Misconduct
The previous section has shown why estoppel against the gov-
ernment should only be allowed when an individual would have
received a statutory benefit but for misrepresentations by govern-
ment agents.7 a Even in those cases, however, estoppel involves a
tension between two competing separation of powers concerns. A
no estoppel rule would frustrate Congress's general intent to pro-
vide a class of persons with benefits; an estoppel rule would frus-
trate statutory or regulatory requirements enacted to govern distri-
bution of those benefits.
The affirmative misconduct standard suggested by the Su-
preme Court presents one way to ease this tension. Affirmative
misconduct can be viewed as an element that tips the separation of
powers balance decisively in favor of estoppel against the govern-
ment. Although the Supreme Court has never defined the affirma-
tive misconduct standard,7 it should be understood to include con-
duct whereby a government official intentionally or recklessly
deprives a beneficiary of a statutory benefit.78
Is 674 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1982), discussed supra notes 39-40, 67, and accompanying
text.
t 6 This approach does not rest on the distinction between procedure and substance
that was emphasized by the Second Circuit and rejected by the Supreme Court in the Han-
sen case. Instead, this approach focuses on conduct that causes a plaintiff to fail to comply
with either the substantive or the procedural terms of a statute or regulation.
7 See supra notes 10-35 and accompanying text.
78 Reckless conduct may occur when a government official gives out information with
reckless disregard for whether the information is true or not or when an individual fails to
qualify for a government benefit as a result of an official's reckless violation of a government
regulation. The Supreme Court has noted that whether an official violated a regulation is
relevant to the affirmative misconduct standard. Hansen, 450 U.S. at 789-90. See also
Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976), where a woman was denied an immi-
grant visa because she married before entering the country, for an example of a finding of
affirmative misconduct where an official violated a government regulation. The court held
that the government was estopped from asserting the plaintiff's lack of a visa because immi-
gration officials had failed to comply with a regulation requiring them to warn her that she
would be ineligible for the visa if she married.
It should be stressed again that an official's failure to comply with a regulation does not
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Intentional or reckless executive branch misconduct that un-
dermines a legislative program poses greater separation of powers
concerns-and consequently a stronger case for abandoning the no
estoppel rule-than does negligent misconduct. Intentional or
reckless subversion of the legislative branch's actions is likely to
present more of an encroachment by the executive branch and to
engender more friction between the branches. By contrast, when
the executive branch is negligent in its efforts to comply with con-
gressional directives, at least it has acted in good faith rather than
showing blatant disregard for congressional interests. General fair-
ness concerns under the due process clause are also implicated
more strongly when the government intentionally or recklessly de-
prives beneficiaries of their statutory entitlements.
Moreover, only in cases of intentional or reckless misconduct
is estoppel necessary to preserve public confidence in government.
Negligent conduct may be more understandable, and indeed is
well-nigh inevitable on occasion as a byproduct of a large govern-
ment bureaucracy. In contrast, citizens are entitled to expect that
their government will not engage in gross misconduct against
them. As the Supreme Court stated in the Heckler case, there are
cases "in which the public interest in ensuring that the Govern-
ment can enforce the law free from estoppel might be outweighed
by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum stan-
dard of decency, honor, and reliability in their dealings with their
Government. 79 In such cases, innocent victims should not be
forced to suffer the consequences of government misconduct. And
while individuals are harmed by negligent conduct as well as by
intentional and reckless conduct, an individual who is the victim of
gross misconduct rather than mere negligence typically suffers a
greater psychological harm.
Pragmatic concerns also counsel in favor of limiting estoppel
against the government to cases of intentional or reckless miscon-
duct. A large array of suits for negligence would threaten a more
significant interference with government operations, as well as sub-
ject the government more frequently to the burdens of defending
against frivolous claims. Allowing estoppel in negligence cases may
itself end the inquiry: the individual's legal authority to obtain the benefit must still be
considered. Thus, while the Third Circuit in Heckler found affirmative misconduct in the
agent's failure to confirm his advice with HHS, see 698 F.2d at 623-24, the Supreme Court
properly disregarded this conclusion. Had the regulations been complied with, HHS still
would have denied plaintiff the double recovery, for in any event the plaintiff would not
have been entitled to receive it.
11 467 U.S. at 60-61.
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also deter government officials from giving needed advice in the
first place.80 This concern is much weaker with an intentional or
reckless misconduct requirement.
The Supreme Court's affirmative misconduct standard can be
viewed as an attempt to limit the potentially far-reaching effects if
the government could be estopped in every case where its agents
have given out wrong information by mistake. Some such limit is
critically necessary if estoppel is to be applied against the govern-
80 The impact of various alternative estoppel rules on the cost of information is un-
clear. Some advocates of estoppel against the government state that economic analysis fa-
vors their position. In their view, applying the estoppel rule just as it would apply to private
parties would eliminate transaction costs currently borne by citizens who, to protect them-
selves against faulty government advice, either must investigate the reliability of the advice
or must purchase insurance, where they can obtain it at all, by finding an agent, paying
policy premiums, and filing a loss claim. See Comment, Never Trust a Bureaucrat: Estop-
pel Against the Government, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 391, 405 (1969). According to this argument,
the risk of loss should be placed on the party that can most easily prevent it. Since a gov-
ernment agent possesses greater expertise and access to information than a private citizen,
the loss should fall on the government. Moreover, the government can more easily discover
the error, for its agents will be exposed to information that could alert them later to their
previous mistake. In contrast, a wheat farmer told that his crop will be insured is unlikely to
check continually to confirm that the advice is still correct. Id. at 404. In addition, allowing
estoppel permits the loss to be distributed through society by higher taxes, causing less
dislocation than if the relying individual bears the entire cost. By contrast, some companies
may choose not to contract with the government if estoppel is not allowed. To the extent
that these firms tend to be the most efficient producers, society will have to pay more for
the services rendered by these firms. Id. at 406.
Yet another scholar argues that estopping the government would be economically ineffi-
cient. See Braustein, In Defense of Traditional Immunity-Toward an Economic Rationale
for Not Estopping the Government, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1982). The reduction in information
offered by the government under a rule estopping the government would increase rather
than decrease transaction costs, according to one study. This would occur because informa-
tion would be withheld, leading to imperfect data, which would result in less optimal choices
than if the information were provided. Simply stated, more information is better than less
information as long as it is reliable, and a rule estopping the government would deter it
from providing information. Id. at 35.
In the final analysis, this debate resolves itself into the empirical question whether so
much information currently is unreliable that a no estoppel rule would lead to transaction
costs exceeding the costs of the information withheld under a more lenient rule. The resolu-
tion of this question is open to debate, but it should be noted that the arguments for apply-
ing estoppel may overestimate the transaction costs of the more restrictive rule. If in fact
few individuals check government advice, then the transaction costs of research are low.
Also, the restrictive rule does not create insurance transaction costs. At present, insurance is
rarely purchased to guard against inaccurate government advice, especially by individuals
who are welfare recipients or new immigrants. On the other hand, in the absence of insur-
ance or requests for advice, private parties have no alternative but to bear the risk them-
selves, which creates costs that seem hidden but are nonetheless real. One further point of
interest is that the lenient alternative rule might add inefficiencies by increasing the number
of requests for government advice. If one's own incorrect reading of a statute does not afford
relief, while the mistaken reading of the same statute by a bureaucrat may do so, this pro-
vides an incentive not to check the rule for oneself, but to ask an official to do so.
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ment at all. In addition, this particular standard achieves the
proper balance between the two competing separation of powers
concerns, as well as addresses the policy issues that arise with
claims of estoppel against the government.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly reversed lower
court decisions estopping the government, it has steadfastly re-
fused to rule out the possibility that the government might be es-
topped in some cases. Yet the Court has refused to indicate what
the appropriate case would be, noting only that estoppel may be
warranted where the government has engaged in "affirmative mis-
conduct." This comment has argued that estoppel should apply
when intentional or reckless unauthorized conduct by executive
branch officials causes citizens to fail to qualify for government
benefits. This approach gives meaning to the Court's affirmative
misconduct standard and resolves the separation of powers con-
cerns that arise if estoppel is applied against the government.
Fred Ansell
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